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This paper formally models the rise in populist politics during the last decade. 
In the literature the rise in populism is attributable both to cultural and 
economic factors. Chief among the latter is the inequality engendered by 
globalization and technical progress. When the plight of the marginalised is 
ignored by mainstream centrist parties, populist challengers rush in 
emphasizing cultural factors, invoking an enviable bygone past reminiscent of 
the golden age of capitalism. In what follows we apply prospect theory, where 
disenchanted individuals support populists because they promise to enact what 
is desirable, even at the expense of harming their already disadvantaged economic 
position. Support for populism depends upon the desirability of some of their 
nationalist policies to an already pre-disposed vote bank, as well as the calculus 
of meme verification. The model also incorporates political competition 
between a populist challenger and a liberal politician, where memes and 
messages are the strategic variables. It is postulated that nations ruled by 
populists are more likely to suffer more greatly from pandemic shocks, due to 
their public policies, except through serendipity or when the populist adopts 





Populist politics and pandemics 1 
some simple analytics 
1 Introduction 
Definitions of populism and populist political surges are notoriously difficult, 
but as discussed in Guriev and Papaioannou (2020) it can be described as a 
“thin centred ideology” which sharply views society as split between two 
antagonistic groups. Thin centred because of ideological ambiguity, and the 
divide between ‘us’ and ‘them’ suggests that populism rises when society 
becomes more polarized.  
There are cultural and economic explanations for such behaviour (Rodrik, 
2019). The cultural explanation emphasizes alienation, exemplified not just in 
the fear of the immigrant ‘other’, but also in inter-generational and educational 
divides within native groups (Norris and Inglehart, 2019). Younger, more 
educated, and economically secure generations embrace more liberal and 
cosmopolitan values in contrast to older more conservative generations 
(Eichengreen, 2018). The economic explanations can be sub-divided into long-
term trends in labour-saving technical progress (automation) and import 
penetration (mostly from China) that displaces local manufacturing. These 
trends result in declining real wages for the median and below median income 
earning household and also make employment more precarious culminating in 
economic inequality and insecurity for median and below median households 
(e.g. Autor et al., 2017; Becker et. Al, 2017; Colatone and Stanig, 2018, for 
example). The inequality also polarizes society into those who are ‘for’ or 
against globalization, liberal values, the wearing of face masks and so on. This 
polarization is more likely when society has a low middle class share of income. 
The national income share of the middle class (defined as having an income in 
the range of 25% above and 25% below median national income) declined 
recently in nearly all Western democracies, with the United States exhibiting 
the lowest middle-class share, and the UK not far behind with the fourth 
lowest share (Milanovic, 2016, figure 4.8).  
Economic shocks such as financial crises lower trust in existing leadership 
(Algan et al., 2017) and engender swings to the right; see the survey in Guriev 
and Papaioannou (2020). Even more important, are the policy responses to 
economic shocks that disadvantage some of the electorate. Fetzer (2019) 
demonstrates that fiscal austerity in the UK (post-2010) significantly 
contributed to the Brexit vote in those regions most adversely affected by 
austerity. It may be argued that the cultural and economic explanations for the 
rise in populism are actually inseparable, at least in the sense that growing 
economic disadvantage and shocks trigger cultural views and prejudices.  
The rise of populist politics has a demand side, based upon the causes 
outlined above. It also has a supply side based on political entrepreneurship of 
 
1 I am grateful to Vanessa Boese and Scott Gates for valuable suggestions that have 
improved the analytical model. 
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new entrants who fill a political gap, and who are able to effectively reach out 
to the disaffected via simple but strong messages, which may include more 
than a modicum of falsehood. Be that as it may, the growth of populism, and 
the support for populist parties, which has seen an increase since 2010 (Guriev 
and and Papaioannou, 2020) results in a realignment of politics away from the 
traditional left-right divide to an elite versus non-elite struggle creates vacuums 
that populists can fill (Gennaioli & Tabellini, 2019, for example). A sanguinary 
blow directed at established elites by supporting populists. even at the risk of 
further impoverishment, is considered more important than centre-left 
redistributive rhetoric by many alienated, conservative and insecure voters.  
Rodrik (2018) argues that the rise in populism coincides with hyper-
globalization. In addition, Rodrik’s study shows that the vote share of populist 
parties since 2000 in selected European and Latin American nations has 
exceeded 10%. This is confirmed by Guriev and Papaioannou (2020) who 
point that populist parties and political parties have been on the rise since 
2010. The year 2016 marked the apogee of populism, when the United States 
elected a populist President, and the electorate in Britain voted to exit the 
European Union at the behest of populist messages. Hence, even in countries 
where the absence of proportional representation sidelines populist parties in 
legislatures, populist politicians can function in mainstream political parties.  In 
Latin America, Venezuela for example, populism tends to be left-wing, harking 
back to the populist left-wing tradition of Peronism in the Argentina during 
the 1930s.  
Mukand and Rodrik (2020) describe right-wing populist politicians as 
those who exploit cultural differences with minorities, and left-wing populism 
as those who champion the cause of the relatively poorer. It may be so that 
right-wing populism is more appealing to voters in societies experiencing 
greater immigration by those with different ethnicities and religion, and where 
the degree of social protection does not keep pace with the increase in 
inequality and marginalization due to policies of austerity. These members of 
the public conflate both economic and social problems with the influx of 
migrants, choosing to scapegoat them for nearly all of society’s difficulties. The 
important aspect is that they are encouraged to think in this way by populist 
politicians and parties. Left-wing movements arise when the majority stands up 
to the elites. 
Indeed, it can be argued that it is no small coincidence that liberal values 
and democracy coexist (Rodrik, 2017). In other words, electoral democracy is a 
process which need not necessarily lead to liberal outcomes; see also Zakaria 
(1997) on illiberal democracy. Equally, liberal values may exist in societies that 
have limitations on aspects of electoral democracy, such as the principle of 
universal adult franchise. The majority can always tyrannize the minority in 
purely elective democracies. Also, populist leaders and regimes show scant 
respect for the constitutional rules of the game, as well as having a plutocratic 
agenda, the full extent of which is often concealed from their support base. 
Arguably, their support base is not overly concerned by their plutocratic 
predilections, as long as a narrow nationalist agenda is implemented. Moreover, 
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for the populist base, factual accuracy is unimportant, as long as the messages 
or memes sent out by the populist leadership are uncomplicated and appealing.  
Analytically speaking, behavioural economics (Bowles, 1998 for example) 
endogenizes individual preferences to social phenomena and history, and the 
economics of identity (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000) highlighting that individual 
behaviour is shaped by group identities. All of this implies that individuals can 
be manipulated by identity based messages to act and vote in certain ways 
which is in accordance with their identity, but is occasionally against their 
individual pecuniary interests, although the outcome may advance group (or 
sub-group) interests. This violates the postulates of the naïve version of homo 
economicus exemplified by the quote at the beginning of the paper. Quite 
obviously, messages and signals about appropriate identity based behavior are 
sent out by the political elite, or aspiring leaders, many of whom have quite 
plutocratic motivations. In the age of social media messages can spread rapidly. 
The rest of the paper formally models populist support determination, and 
political competition between a populist challenger, who is filling in a vacuum 
caused by the failure of centrist policies, and a traditional centrist or liberal 
politician. We apply prospect theory, where disenchanted individuals support 
populists because they promise to enact what is desirable, even at the expense of 
harming their already disadvantaged economic position. Support for populism 
depends upon the desirability of some of their nationalist policies to an already 
pre-disposed vote bank, as well as the calculus of meme verification. The 
political competition between a populist challenger and a liberal politician is via 
memes and messages to the electorate, and these are the strategic variables. It 
is postulated that nations ruled by populists are more likely to suffer more 
greatly from pandemic shocks, due to their public policies, except through 
serendipity or when the populist adopts more benevolent authoritarian 
practices. In the game form postulated below rival politicians choose the 
messages they wish to send to the electorate to elicit their support, who then 
choose whether to believe them based on their predilections and the 




2   The model and solution 
Society has a total population, N, which can be decomposed into two groups 
A and B, with A being conservative, who may support a populist politician. 
The conservative group derives utility from a nationalist identity and the 
provision of group specific public goods. B, represents the liberal group, who 
derive their identity from a liberal cosmopolitan standpoint. Membership of 
these two groups are fluid and changes over time; this can be captured by 
voting behaviour. Society is unequal so that the median income is lesser than 
the mean income, YN. The representative (median) individual belongs to the 
majority group and has income Yi < YN and in some senses can be considered 
to be ‘poor’. Thus there is both socioeconomic class, as well as identity 
markers that cut across socio-economic class. Individuals also derive utility 
from their identity (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000) and self-image (Boulding, 
1956). Generically, individual utility (U) for a member of the conservative A 
group is: 
 
UAi  = f(Yi, Ii)  (1) 
        
Here, the first term on the right hand side of (1) refers to income, which 
will be defined in different ways for different types of individuals below. I 
refers to identity based arguments in the utility function. These may be related 
to the following factors, for an individual i, in the A group: 
 
  (2) 
 
The first term on the right hand side of (2) refers to the mean income of 
the majority group (YA) relative to the population mean income (YN). The idea 
is that identity based behaviour dictates that the person derives utility from the 
mean income of his own group increasing relative to other groups, even when 
his own individual income declines. The second term, θA is a group specific 
vector of public goods, which is rather like a club good, defined by Cornes and 
Sandler (1996) in that is non-rivalled but excludable in nature. This includes a 
variety of nationalistic, anti-immigrant, anti-minority policies, but less public 
health and education expenditure than in alternative states. The final term, λ, 
refers to a vector of identity based actions, as outlined in Akerlof and Kranton 
(2000), as well as Murshed (2011). In the context of the pandemic this can 
include denying its existence, attending right wing protests, eschewing face 
masks and so on. For members of the more liberal group, their utility typically 
will be in terms of societal mean income, a public good that is available to the 
entire population, as well as liberal behaviour.  
Any individual citizen faces two possible states of the world, which he can 
only influence via voting and political supportive behaviour. In one, offered by 
politician A, appealing to group A, occuring with the probability π, the voter 
potentially sacrifices his individual economic interests so as to promote group 
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interests which take the shape of average group income rising relative to the 
other group, as well as the provision of the group specific public goods (θA). In 
some societies this could be the outcome of elections2 or a referendum given 
the rise in the number of electoral democracies.3 The individual we are 
describing here is not a political entrepreneur but is asked to vote for a 
politician through a mechanism such as a meme. The plutocratic populist 
politician or political faction then enables the emergence this state of the world 
via a vector of policies, and presumably further enriches the already rich, but 
permits some nationalistic identity policies and gestures, such as restrictions on 
immigration, Brexit and the proscription of Muslims in India. In that event, 
identity trumps economic interests. In another state, B, with probability 1 – π, 
enlightened self-interest or homo economicus prevails. In this state, the economic 
interests of the majority or median voter (Downs, 1957), as traditionally 
understood in political economy, are realised along with the universal provision 
of public goods (θN). Public goods include education and health expenditure, 
club goods encompass nationalistic policies. These may assist in mitigating the 
effects of the pandemic on excess mortality and unemployment. 
We may, therefore, characterise the expected utility of a representative 
median individual, who may belong to either of the two groups, as: 
 
] + (1-    (3) 
 
In the populist outcome in the first term on the right hand side of (3), 
relative income of group A rises compared to the mean along with the 
provision of group specific club goods and policies. In the second type of 
outcome, indicated by the second term on the right hand side, mean income is 
more fairly distributed and there is greater provision of public goods.  
It would be appropriate to apply prospect theory to the expected utility 
framework above, following Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Instead of 
probabilities, individuals assign decision weights to each prospect in their 
universe of choices. The decision weight depends, not just its likelihood or 
probability but also its desirability in the decision maker’s mind. A more worthy 
prospect is assigned a greater decision weight. Hence, mental framing is crucial 






2 Instead of voting other actions, such as protest, violence or genocide can also be 
incorporated into the model.  
3 As Mukand and Rodrik (2020) point out electoral democracies are not always liberal 
democracies which have firm constraints on the executive, a commitment to the rule 
of law and respect for minority human rights.    
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In (4) above the decision weights are denoted by w, the first (populist) 
outcome’s decision weight is a function of its probability, as well as messaging, 
m, from populist politicians. Similarly, the non-populist prospect depends on 
its probability and messaging, n, from more conventional politicians.4 The 
parameter S represents the cost of processing messages, a and e, from the 
populist and liberal politicians, equivalent to a signal attraction problem, 
involving discernment costs. The parameter φ reflects the type of individual 
processing the message. PA and PB refer to losses due to the pandemic; it is 
postulated that PA > PB, due to greater inequality, less public health 
expenditures and policies (late lockdowns) in the former case. 
Equilibrium individual choices involve maximizing (4) with respect to a 
and e, and arranging them in terms of marginal benefit equal to marginal cost 







In (5) the marginal ‘benefit’ of the signal is on the right hand side, with the 
marginal cost on the left hand side. Both the benefit and the cost of the 
message received from the politician depends upon individual type. The 
marginal benefit (ma) of the populist to a type A individual is high, and the 
same individual attaches a high decision weight to the prospect (wA).  In other 
words, type A individuals are pre-disposed to supporting populism. A 
relatively deprived voter who is precariously employed with declining social 
protection may give greater credence to the former ‘meme’ message because it 
is more intrinsically desirable. Moreover, a powerful meme, when constructed 
in simple terms, bereft of expert opinion can spread like a virus, irrespective of 
its veracity. This will occur if the cost of processing is low, as φ→0, as is the 
case for the type A individual, who is likely to support the populist. Exactly, 
the converse line of reasoning holds for the type B (liberal) individual for 
whom φ→1 and the marginal benefit of the liberal political campaign message 
(ne) is high, as is the decision weight for this outcome (wB).  The parameter, φ, 
can be subjected to change. It may even evolve over time in a Bayesian fashion, 
with individuals updating priors based upon current information. Thus, the 
individual chooses whether to support the message of two competing political 
camps. If there is an electoral majority of type A individuals, the populist 
leader or party comes into power. But in the form of the game described by us, 
this occurs after politicians decide on their equilibrium strategies.  
The next step, therefore, is to describe political competition. Let us 
characterise this as the rivalry between a politician or party drawn from group 
 
4 Strictly speaking, only populists send out memes, liberal politicians, although not 
averse to soundbites and catchphrases, tend to project more measured arguments, 
which for many members of the public feel like tedious expert arguments.  
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A and one from group B. The former, who is the populist, utilises a meme (a), 
and the latter a message (e). Although both politicians want to enrich 
themselves personally, the politician from group B, proposes more inclusive 
policies; whereas the politician from the nationalistic and conservative group 
emphasises identity, and the fact that the group’s interests will go further, even 
though it will immiserize the poor amongst them even more.5 The memes and 
messages themselves are not detailed policy pronouncements but are 
composed of metaphors that encourage certain types of voting behaviour. 








Here the probability of the identity based outcome (π) promoted by 
politician, A, is enhanced through memes (a), and the probability 1 – π of the 
alternative is increased via memes (e). The cost functions associated with these 
memes are given by C and E in equations (6) and (7) respectively. The W 
parameter indicates pay-offs to the politician from the A and B groups 
(denoted by a superscript); the subscripts indicate who is in power, for example 
WAB indicates the pay-off to A when B is in power, and so on. In other words, 
political competition is not over a totally winner take all prize. Furthermore, 
the pay-offs are composed of: 
 
=  (8) 
 
=  (9) 
 
=  (10) 
 









5 The politicians could also make cheap talk policy announcements and then renege 




In equation (8), the pay-off to the politician6 from the A group when in 
power consists of a rent, R, when in power less the cost of providing his share 
(γ > 1/2) of the public good, θA. The parameter D represents an authoritarian 
rent obtainable by populists representing their control of institutions, including 
those that exercise constraints on the executive. We can safely assert that 
during national emergencies, such as a COVID-19 pandemic, these 
authoritarian rents increase as greater executive powers are assumed. When out 
of power, equation (9) indicates that the politician from the A group receives a 
smaller rent, and contributes his share (β < 1/2) towards the general public 
good, θN. Equation (10) indicates the rent received by the politician from the B 
group less his share (1 – β) of the contribution towards the general public 
good. Similarly, (11) indicates the pay-off when out of power for the elite in 
the B group, where 1 – γ is the B political groupings contribution to the 
sectarian club good θA. Rents received by the populist politician are greater 
than the liberal politician, and total public goods provision is higher under the 
liberal auspices, compared to the club goods provision by the populist. 
The probabilities of the two states of nature (π and (1 – π)) increase with 
use of the memes (a, e) by the two political antagonists. The populist message 
is a classic meme, and in many cases the liberal message is a less attractive 
expert opinion; it may state the ‘truth’, but it may lack the power and simplicity 
of the populist message. These will be the two strategic variables in the arena 
of political competition. There are, however, diminishing returns to these 
activities (πaa and πee <0).7 These In addition we postulate that that the costs of 
sending out the meme messages can diminish (a1 < 0) if, following Shiller 
(2017), the contagion rate, c exceeds the recovery rate, r in equation (6). This 
will encourage greater meme sending activity (a) by the A group politician, 
which at the limit go ‘viral’. A higher contagion rate can be attributed to both 
long-term and short-term factors. A long history of rising inequality, 
immiserization of former manufacturing workers, increased immigration can 
produce conditions in which certain narratives and memes related to the 
deprivation of the poor, when couched in appropriate identity based narratives, 
are more likely to both spread fast in the short-run and produce populist 
outcomes that actually favour the rich but enhance the identity based 
behavioural aspects of the utility of the poor. By contrast, the more sober non-
populist message is not subject to diminishing costs.   
The politicians of the A and B group, respectively maximize their value 
functions with respect to the strategic variables, a and e in (6) and (7) 
respectively leading to the equating of marginal benefits and costs: 
 
  (12) 
 
 
6 The pay-offs are to be shared among the political elite belonging to the group in 
question.  
7 If there are increasing returns to scale in the memes then there is a risk of a war of 
attrition between the two antagonists; see Mavrotas, Murshed and Torres (2011). Also, 





 =  (13) 
 
 Equation (12) and (13) can be the basis for deriving reaction functions to 
describe the non-cooperative behaviour of the two political antagonists. This is 
done by taking derivatives of (12) and (13) with respect to a and e and taking 
the ratios: 
 
 0 if   (14) 
 
 0 if  (15) 
 
As can be readily discerned if the two strategies are complements (πae > 0) 
the reaction functions of both parties will be positively sloped as in figure 1. If, 
however, the strategies are substitutes (πae < 0) then the reaction functions are 
negatively sloped as in figure 2. The latter situation can arise if say the liberal 
leaders from group B are weakened, and any increase in the profitability of 
messaging by the leadership of the majority group can cause group B leaders to 
frantically engage in more messaging to counter the effectiveness of the memes 
of the majority. RA refers to the reaction functions of the A group politician, 
and RB indicates reaction functions of the minority, B group politicians.  
When a pandemic strikes the nation state hard, as it did in many countries 
in 2020, we would expect some variations in the parameters. We postulate that 
the pandemic hits harder when the state is run by the populist in the outcome 
denoted by state A in (4), PA > PB. This is because public health expenditure 
and pandemic prevention policies, such as the speed of imposing lockdown, 
are smaller in that state. In empirical terms, excess mortality would be greater 
in populist states, unless via serendipity, or if the populist rulers behave more 
like benevolent authoritarian rulers, increasing health expenditure and 
preventive measures.  
In countries ruled by established populists, the accumulated rent via, the 
parameter D in equation (8) is high. This may become even greater given the 
tendencies for post-pandemic autocratic power grabs and the heightened use 
of executive orders (Hungary, for example); see Coyne and Yatsyshina (2020). 
In some cases the costs of signalling to the populist leader may diminish in (6), 
via a1 <0. Both these factors will affect the payoffs from power and lower the 
cost of meming in (6), (8) and (12). The reaction function of the populist leader 
shifts upwards along the reaction function of the liberal politician. The populist 
is incentivized to meme more, and his opponent must also follow suit. From 
the initial position at point A in figures 1 and 2, the new equilibrium will be at 
point B. In figure 1 both parties will have increased their messaging efforts to 
the electorate. This is when meming and messaging are strategic complements 
for both parties, as is usually the case. In figure 2, when the strategies are 
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substitutes, an increase in the profitability of meming on the part of the 
majority group (A) leaders causes less effort by group A in terms of a and 
more effort by group B in terms of e, for the reasons outlined in the previous 
paragraph. In that case the liberal or centrist political faction has to counteract 
more, whereas the populist is in such a strong position that he has to meme 
less. There is the possibility, however, for changes in the parameter φ, based 
upon the success or failure of pandemic management. If either because of 
policies or sheer serendipity the pandemic does not cause much excess 
mortality (Hungary, Poland), then the public faith in the populist may remain 
buoyant. If, however, as is the case in the USA, the UK, India and Brazil 
populist leaders preside over large excess mortality outcomes due to the 
COVID-19 outbreak, faith in the populist leader’s ability to manage the 
ravaged economy and the pandemic may diminish, φ could rise in (5).    
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3  Conclusions 
Our present time is characterised by the growth of populism and illiberalism 
almost universally. Illiberal objectives are more often than not achieved via the 
ballot box. This frequently involves making the median voter vote for a party 
or package that will immiserize him individually but enrich the group in a 
fractionalised society. His behaviour is encouraged as being in conformity with 
identity based behaviour. Additionally, in many developing countries leaders 
strengthen their positions, increase their incumbency in office by promising to 
promote development in return for greater power, akin to a Hobbesian 
authoritarian contract. In understanding these differences, we can draw upon 
the findings in experimental behavioural economics, but especially the 
economics of identity, which inform us that individuals do not always obtain 
utility by maximising individual income. Rather their preferences are partly 
determined by social interaction, including the influence of social media and 
this may lead them to violate the postulates of homo economicus, by allowing 
identity based actions to trump personal pecuniary interest. In some 
circumstances certain false messages (memes) can become more attractive and 
spread more rapidly, especially in the context of endemic poverty and rising 
inequality. 
This paper has presented a formal model of populist politics which 
features both individual choice for populist support, as well as electoral 
competition in the form of memes and messages between rival politicians, one 
of whom is a populist. It is the politician’s choice of message and its appeal to 
the electorate that determines the political outcome. Individual choices are 
framed not just by the traditional political economy regard for individual 
economic self-interest, but by decision weights as in prospect theory, 
emphasizing desirability rather than pure probability. The median voter may 
find the populist message more desirable in the contexts discussed at length in 
the populism literature, but the message also needs to be credible, and the 
model introduces verification costs. In the context of populist leadership, 
pandemics can strike harder with more excess mortality and economic fallout 
because modern right-wing populist governments invest less in public health 
and preventive measures, and society in general is more unequal. Casual 
empiricism would support that postulate, as evidenced by the cases of the 
United States, the UK, Brazil and India. Populists may also use the pandemic 
to consolidate their hold on power by grabbing rights to rule by decree and 
initiate policing by executive order. There is, however, the possibility that 
populist ruled states are spared some of the worst ravages of the pandemic 
through sheer luck (Hungary); that non-populist governed nations adopt laissez 
faire type populist policies (Sweden); that populists behave benevolently and act 
swiftly to counter the pandemic and its effects, as some authoritarian rulers 
occasionally do.  Either way, the current pandemic may engender a revision of 
the electorate’s perceptions about those who govern them.   
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